INTRODUCTION
The EU Climate and Energy Package (the Package) is a complex and comprehensive set of legal acts aimed at responding to global and EU-wide climate change and energy challenges and integrating climate change considerations into a range of sectors and policies. As the Package illustrates how the body of legal norms related to climate change is expanding rapidly and becoming increasingly specialized, 1 assessing its innovations and broader implications from the viewpoint of general EU law becomes more difficult. Not only is the Package closely linked to the EU's position in the negotiations on a future climate change regime under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 2 but it also features other intertwined international dimensions, ranging from its relationship to World Trade Organization (WTO) law 3 to the EU's negotiating position in other multilateral fora, such as under the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) 4 and discussions on 'green growth' in the lead-up to the 2012 UN Conference on Sustainable Development (known as "Rio+20"). 5 The Package also has significant implications for the EU's external relations at the bilateral level. Against this background, this article analyzes the Package to assess the way in which the EU attempts to use its internal legislation to influence international processes, on the one hand; and, to assess the influence of international law on EU law, on the other hand. While the phenomenon of 'globalizing' EU law has not escaped the attention of political scientists 6 and EU lawyers, 7 this article seeks to bring into the spotlight the complex interactions between the legal tools that are used to these ends: inwardly, legislative choices at EU level; 8 and outwardly, reliance on EU law in various multilateral fora and bilateral agreements. 1 The argument has been made that climate change law is in the process of becoming a distinct legal discipline. See 3 Final Act of the 1986-1994 Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations (adopted 15 Apr. 1994, entered into force 1 Jan. 1995) 1867 UNTS 14 (WTO Agreements). 4 Convention on Biological Diversity (adopted 5 Jun. 1992, entered into force 29 Dec. 1993) 1760 UNTS 79 (CBD). 5 The General Assembly, at its sixty-fourth session, adopted resolution A/RES/64/236 convening in 2012 a United Nations Conference on Sustainable Development at the highest possible level, including Heads of State and Government or other representatives, with a two-fold focus on the "green economy" in the context of sustainable development and poverty eradication; and on the institutional framework for sustainable development. 6 Kelemen, "Globalizing European Union Environmental Policy", Princeton Annual Workshop on European Integration, 1 May 2009, < http://www.princeton.edu/~smeunier/Kelemen.doc> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. Kelemen mentions examples related to climate change, GMOs, trade and environment, and chemicals. 7 de Witte, "International law as a tool for the European Union", 5 EUConst (2009) , 265-283. 8 The EU Treaty-based requirement of environmental integration will be used as a lens to analyse the Package. Environmental integration is one of the general principles of EU law, framed in legally binding terms by the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TEFU), which provides that environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and implementation of the EU's policies and activities. 9 In this article, both the external and internal dimensions of environmental integration will be referred to. External environmental integration entails that the EU environmental objectives, principles and criteria 10 are "applied" in other policy areas in the same way as they must be applied in the environmental policy: that is, that policy areas other than environmental protection must "pursue" the environmental objectives of the EU, "aim at" or "be based on" its environmental principles, and "take account of" its environmental criteria. 11 Internal environmental integration, in turn, entails that EU environmental law itself is to be construed and interpreted broadly, taking into consideration all of the EU environmental objectives, principles and criteria, 12 basically requiring a holistic approach to EU environmental law-making. 13 For present purposes, external environmental integration serves to assess the extent to which the Package has contributed to integrating climate change concerns into non-environmental 9 Art. 11 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (entered into force 1 Dec. 2009 Art. 191 (1) TFEU reads as follows: "Union policy on the environment shall contribute to pursuit of the following objectives: preserving, protecting and improving the quality of the environment, protecting human health, prudent and rational utilisation of natural resources, promoting measures at international level to deal with regional or worldwide environmental problems, and in particular combating climate change." 16 The justiciability of the principle against EU Institutions is discussed by Jans and Vedder, cited supra note 14, pp. 20-21, who conclude that "only in very exceptional cases (i.e. manifest error of appraisal) a measures will be subject of annulment because certain environmental objectives have not been taken sufficiently into account" (on the basis of the Case C-341/95, Gianni Bettati, [1998] ECR I-4355). 17 33 It remains unclear whether the securitization of climate change 34 will also lead to an involvement in climate politics of the High Representative of the EU for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, 35 although the European Parliament has already made such a recommendation. 36 While these developments have certainly contributed to raising the profile of climate change within the EU, the priority attached to climate change has been received with caution and possibly concern by leading commentators, who saw a possible risk for achieving internal environmental integration: Lee stressed, for instance, that "[p]icking one environmental problem (however serious) has to raise certain concerns about ongoing efforts to take a more holistic, integrated and sophisticated approach to environmental governance." 37 On the other hand, this can be interpreted more positively in terms of external environmental integration, as leading to a 'new phase in environmental governance in the EU', where climate change as a 'high politics' environmental issue will bear considerable potential for 'mutual integration of climate change concerns with energy and security policy.' 38
The ascent of EU's climate change policy legislation has been closely linked to the EU's desire to play an international leadership role in the fight against climate change. Already in the early 1990s during negotiations leading to the UNFCCC, the EU (unsuccessfully) pushed for strong international commitments. 39 An important step was taken in May 2002 when the then European Community and its fifteen Member States ratified the Kyoto Protocol, 40 a particularly significant move coming a year after the US announced that it would not be ratifying the Protocol. 41, The EU subsequently sought to show its leadership by creating the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) when the future of the Kyoto Protocol was still hanging in balance, 42 and used its political clout to secure the Protocol's entry into force. 43 The Climate and Energy Package can be seen as yet another attempt by the EU to 'lead by example' at a time when both the legal shape and details of future international climate change cooperation under the UNFCCC remain undecided.
With the Package, the EU emphasises that it already has in place the regulatory framework to implement key aspects of its climate policy beyond the Kyoto Protocol's first commitment period, ending in December 2012. This is a notable achievement, though the 20% by 2020 emission reduction objective underlying the Package has been criticised by the civil society and some developing countries arguing that it is not ambitious enough for the EU to show international climate change leadership. After the 2009 UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen failed to bring conclusive results, 44 the EU has engaged in internal debates on whether it should raise its level of ambition and implement the 30% target. In May 2010, the Commission released a communication on possible new policies and measures that would need to be added to the Package for the EU to achieve the 30% target by 2020. 45 The Council was initially expected to make a decision on the 30% target by October 2010 46 but the decision was postponed due to lack of consensus.
While showing leadership in the international climate change negotiations has been a prominent driver for the adoption of the Package, it was not the only one. The Package responds to multiple concerns within the EU, from energy security 47 and long-term economic competitiveness, to trade and development cooperation. 48 The basic philosophy underlying the Package is that climate change objectives can be achieved while continuing to pursue economic prosperity and job-creation within the EU. 49 The Package seeks "to put Europe on the road to the future" and ensure that by the year 2050, Europe will look "very different" in terms of supplying its energy needs. 50 According to the Commission, therefore, the transition to a low-carbon future can be achieved while continuing to pursue economic growth: the Package represents an opportunity to "make climate-friendly policies a major driver for growth and jobs in Europe" and for Europe to show that "necessary change can go hand in hand with a competitive and prosperous economy fit for the 21st century." 51 Accordingly, the EU climate goals significantly shaped the recent "Europe 2020 Strategy" for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 52 all forms of renewable energy 57 and aiming to increase the share of renewable energy to 20% of the total and 10% of energy in the transportation sector. 58 59 . 60 The Renewables Directive also includes unprecedented sustainability criteria for the production of biofules, and is, in this respect, linked to another element of the Package, a revised directive setting environmental standards for fuel, 61 with a view to facilitating the more widespread blending of biofuels into petrol and diesel. integration and international dimensions of the key elements of the Package, the EU ETS Directive will be addressed first.
THE EU ETS
The EU ETS is the world's most important greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme. 66 It is a cap-and-trade scheme, covering more than 12,000 operators. By creating a price for greenhouse gas emissions, the EU ETS has attempted to integrate climate change considerations into the strategic thinking of the covered economic sectors and, at least in theory, created an incentive for business to start investing in low-carbon technologies. 67 Having internalized some climate change costs into sectors such as power generation, iron and steel, refineries, cement and other building materials, as well as pulp and paper, 68 the ETS can also be seen as a critical tool for implementing the external dimension of the environmental integration principle. 69 All this is in line with messages from the Fourth Assessment Report by the IPCC and the Stern Review of the Economics of Climate Change that introducing a price for greenhouse gas emissions is one of the most effective ways to mitigate climate change. 70 At the international level, the EU is hoping that the ETS will inspire other countries to establish similar schemes and to expand the global carbon market through interlinked emissions trading schemes, first within countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and later including other major economies. 71 According to the Commission's vision, the OECD-wide market would be driven by a transatlantic carbon market, created by linking the EU ETS to a future greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme in the US. 72 This section begins with a brief overview of the ETS and the key reforms introduced by the Package. It then analyses the ETS in the international context, focusing on its relevance for the EU's climate change leadership and its relationship with international law, including the UNFCCC and the WTO.
A. Overview of the EU ETS
The ETS marked a U-turn in the EU's attitude towards carbon trading and market-based instruments. During the Kyoto Protocol negotiations, prior to 1997, the EU and developing countries opposed market-based mechanisms, which were favoured by the US and other 66 The EU ETS estimated value was !63 billion of the overall !86 billion value of the global carbon market in 2008. "Executive Summary" in Capoor and Ambrosi, "State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009" (The World Bank, Washington D.C., May 2009), 1-2. 67 A critical assessment maintains that in fact the EU ETS has locked-in current emissions and provided incentives for industries not to reduce (and even increase) their emissions. Sandbag, "Cap or trap? How the EU ETS risks locking-in carbon emissions", (September 2010) <http://www.sandbag.org.uk/reports/> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 68 From 2013, the ETS will also cover carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from the chemical and aluminium sectors. As it will be explained below, aviation emissions will also be included under the ETS from 2012 onwards. 69 The directive lists all six greenhouse gas covered by the Kyoto Protocol in accordance in its Annex A. During the first two trading periods, it has focused on carbon dioxide. From 2013 onwards, the ETS will also cover carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide and perfluorocarbons from the chemical and aluminium sectors. Member States can also unilaterally include additional activities and gases, subject to approval by the Commission. 70 The ETS applies to the 27 EU Member States, Norway, Liechtenstein and Iceland. Operators covered by the ETS must hold a permit to engage in activities covered by the Directive. A competent national authority issues the permit after it is satisfied that the operator is capable of monitoring and reporting its emissions. 76 Each year, operators must surrender allowances (EU Allowances, EUAs) corresponding to their monitored and verified greenhouse gas emissions during the previous year. Operators whose emissions are below their quota may sell their excess allowances. In contrast, operators whose emissions exceed their quota must purchase allowances to cover their excess emissions as failure to surrender allowances results in a penalty of !100 per EUA. 77 Each Member State has a national greenhouse gas registry, in other words, an electronic database where the creation, transfer and surrender of EUA are registered. There is also a central registry in Brussels, still known as the Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL). 78
The first "learning-by-doing" Phase of the ETS ran from 2005 to 2007, with a focus on setting up the necessary institutions and procedures. 79 Phase II, 2008-2012, runs in parallel with the first commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol and plays an important role in ensuring that the EU and its Member States comply with the Kyoto target. 80 Phase III of the ETS -as amended through the Package -will take place between 2013 and 2020 regardless of developments at the international level. 81 In order to improve its cost-effectiveness, the ETS is linked to the two project-based flexibility mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, the CDM and JI. 82 Each EUA corresponds to one ton of carbon dioxide equivalent. As the price of EUA in the first half of 2010 was in the 10-20! range, there is a clear incentive for installations to purchase EUAs rather than face the penalty. 78 The website of the CITL can be accessed at: <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/ets/> accessed 8 Nov. 2010. 79 Some of the key challenges during the first trading period included the identification of covered installations, organizing public consultations and lack of verified emissions data, which resulted in over-allocation of allowances. 80 For the second trading period, emissions in the EU ETS sector have been capped at around 6.5 % below their levels in 2005. 81 to comply with their emissions allocations. The main motivation was to enable companies to take advantage of the cost-efficient mitigation opportunities in developing countries and countries in transition to a market economy.
In terms of external environmental integration, the amended Directive extends the sectors covered by the EU ETS, notably adding the chemical industry, and the aviation sector, as well as more activities under the previously included energy, metal, mineral and paper sectors. 83 Of particular interest is the decision to include in the ETS emissions from all flights taking off and landing in the EU from 2012 onwards. 84 This can be seen as a response to a long-standing impasse under the UNFCCC on whether and under which international forum to take action on emissions from international aviation and maritime transport (bunker fuels).
For the purposes of our analysis, the EU unilateral action on aviation emissions illustrates how the environmental integration requirement links with the international relevance of the ETS: the EU is attempting to integrate climate change considerations into the aviation sector whose rapidly growing emissions could offset the impact of mitigation in other sectors. 85 At the same time, the EU is seeking to influence international behaviour in the aviation sector, and the fact that the scheme will apply to non-European airlines has been subject to protests and even legal action. 86 Overall, however, the ETS is often (but not universally) perceived as a success in that it has introduced a price for greenhouse gas emissions from energy intensive sectors in the EU, thereby sending a price signal for business to start investing in low-carbon technologies and mainstreaming climate change considerations into their strategies. 87 supported by this legal tool. One of the key debates has concerned the strictness of the emissions cap and the method of allocating EUAs to the participating installations. In theory, the two main choices for allocating allowances are so-called grandfathering (whereby allowances are distributed free of charge based on historical emissions) and auctioning (whereby participating installations are required to purchase the necessary allowances). During its first two phases, the ETS has mainly used grandfathering with the vast majority of EUAs allocated for free through National Allocation Plans (NAPs) drawn up by each Member State and notified to the Commission. 89 Essentially, the Member State decided the overall amount of allowances and the criteria for allocating them during each of the first two trading periods, with the Commission having the power to reject a NAP or a part of it. As the effectiveness and desirability of this method was subject to debate, 90 the method of allocating EUAs was one of the key reforms to the ETS brought about by the Package. National emissions caps determined by the Member States will be replaced by an EU-wide emissions cap defined in the Directive that decreases in a linear manner by a factor of 1.74%. 91 According to the Commission, this reform "provides a long-term perspective and increased predictability, which is required for long-term investments in efficient abatement." 92 Furthermore, auctioning will become the basic principle of allocation. According to the Commission's original proposal in January 2008, auctioning was to become the norm for the power sector from 2013 onwards, 93 but some limited exceptions were adopted as a lastminute compromise to ensure support for the Package by some of the new Member States. 94 For industrial installations, auctioning will be gradually increased during Phase III, starting at 30% in 2013, and reaching 70% in 2020 and 100% in 2027. 95 In those cases where allowances are not auctioned, they will be allocated based on harmonized rules. 96 However, less than two years after the negotiations of the Package, the environmental effectiveness of the ETS is once again being debated. 97 Because of the global economic 89 Around 95% of allowances were allocated free of charge during the first phase and around 90% during the second phase. According to Art. 9 of Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 20, the Commission may reject the NAP or any aspect thereof on the basis that it is incompatible with the criteria specified in the Directive. 90 On both occasions, the NAP process was also slow to administer. The fact that the allocations for the first trading period were not based on verified emissions also gave rise to problems. While the aim was to set the cap close to business-as-usual emissions during Phase I of the ETS, the price of EUAs eventually collapsed from its high at around ! 30 close to zero as monitored data released in the spring of 2006 concerning the first year showed that that the cap was too lax and the actual emissions were lower than the allocations. Directive 2009 /29/EC, cited supra note 20, preambular para 19 and Art. 10(c). 95 Ibid., preambular para. 21. The Commission originally proposed to reach full auctioning in these sectors by 2020. 96 Ibid., Art. 10(a). 97 Another issue that could compromise the effectiveness of the EU ETS is the use of international offsets. For example, in 2009, while credits from international offsets accounted for only 4.3% of credits surrendered under downturn, emissions in the sectors covered by the ETS have decreased more rapidly than expected -verified emissions under the ETS in 2009 were 11.6% below 2008 emissions and carbon prices fell correspondingly, with a drop in early 2009 from some !25 to !8 per EUA. 98 This has provoked criticism that the cap is too lax and that the ETS does not provide incentives for operators to make structural investments to reduce their emissions. 99 In May 2010, the Commission acknowledged that the economic analysis underlying the Package was no longer valid and suggested "recalibrating" the ETS by setting aside EUAs originally intended for auction. 100 It remains to be seen what course of action -if any -the Member States will choose to take in response to the Commission's proposals. 101102 For present purposes, this seems to indicate that ensuring effective incorporation of climate change considerations into decision-making by the covered sectors (external environmental integration) can be a challenging task. In other words, during its first two trading periods, the ETS has struggled to set the cap at a level that would provide an effective price signal -first because of lack of reliable information on past emissions and then due to unforeseen impacts of the global economic downturn. This means that the effectiveness of the ETS during the third trading period is once again questionable.
B. The Package and Effectiveness of the ETS

C. International Dimensions of the ETS: Climate Finance, Carbon Leakage and Expanding the Global Carbon Market
One of the key issues in the negotiations under the UNFCCC relates to finance for mitigation and adaptation actions in developing countries, 103 which is also linked to questions of internal environmental integration. It has been estimated that such financing needs will amount to billions of euros per year by 2020. 104 In its proposal to amend the EU ETS and make auctioning the default method of allocation, the Commission suggested using a proportion of auctioning revenues: (2007),595-596. 98 Europa, "EU ETS: Emissions fall more than 11% in 2009" (Press Release) IP/10/576, 18 May 2010. 99 Sandbag briefing paper, cited supra note 88. 100 According to the Commission, the cost of complying with the -20% target is now estimated at !48 billion rather than the previously estimated "at least !70 billion." Commission Communication, cited supra note 45. 101 In June 2010, the Council concluded that the Commission's communication covers a wide range of issues which need to be discussed in-depth in order to prepare the EU for the medium-and longer-term climate change challenges, and agreed to "to revert to these issues as soon as possible and in any case no later than at its October 2010 session." COEU, "Analysis of options to move beyond 20% greenhouse gas emission reductions and assessing the risk of carbon leakage" ( The Commission originally proposed that "at least 20%" of the revenues generated from the auctioning of allowances under the ETS should be used for activities related to climate change mitigation and adaptation. 106 The final version refers to "at least 50%" of the auctioning revenues or "the equivalent value of these revenues," leaving the Member States discretion to decide how to spend the auctioning revenues. 107 Additions and specifications were also made to the list of possible activities, including references to the Kyoto Protocol Adaptation Fund, technology transfer, as well as afforestation and reforestation activities in developing countries. The chosen approach arguably reflects internal environmental integration to the extent that auctioning revenues generated under the ETS will be used to pursue a holistic approach to climate change mitigation and adaptation, by funding activities to avoid or mitigate adverse environmental impacts on biodiversity from CCS and deforestation, or to promote ecosystem-based adaptation. The overall idea of using climate financing for an integrated implementation of different multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) is put forward by the EU also in international fora: for instance, the EU argues that climate financing should be used to achieve both climate change and biodiversity objectives. 108
Considering the international dimension of the climate finance provisions in the ETS, it can be asked whether they are ambitious enough for the EU to assert global leadership in this area. Within the EU, the question of finance was subject to an internal debate throughout 2009. The lack of decisive position in the negotiations leading up to Copenhagen provoked criticism especially from civil society and the EU was accused of "putting a global climate deal at risk and threatening the lives of millions of the world's poorest." 109 In the autumn 2009, the Commission published a blueprint for climate finance, estimating that "finance requirements for adaptation and mitigation in developing countries could reach roughly !100 billion a year by 2020." 110 This would mean "international public funding in the range of !22 105 COM(2008) 16 final, cited supra note 92, Art. 10(3), at 22-23. 106 to 50 billion per year in 2020," of which the EU's share would be approximately between 10-30%. 111 On meeting this funding requirement through auctioning revenues from the ETS, the Commission estimates:
Whilst it is difficult to be precise about the future carbon price and therefore the size of auctioning revenues, it is estimated that if the EU was required to finance !3 billion in 2013 -the upper end of the scale -this would account for between 7 and 20% of total auction revenues. It would therefore be well covered by the revenues flowing into government treasuries from climate change policies. 112
In November 2009, the Council agreed to endorse these Commission's financing estimates but without specifying the EU's share. 113 In Copenhagen, the EU pledged !7.2 billion of fasttrack financing for a three-year period in 2010-2012 and is currently negotiating with recipient countries on how to implement this. 114 In the event that other developed countries and other major emitters of greenhouse gases do not participate in an international agreement that will achieve the objective of limiting global temperature increase to 2°C, certain energy-intensive sectors and sub-sectors in the Community subject to international competition could be exposed to the risk of carbon leakage. This could undermine the environmental integrity and benefit of actions by the Community. 118
In 2009, the Commission determined sectors exposed to carbon leakage based on the criteria listed in the ETS Directive adopted as a part of the Package. 119
The key to preventing carbon leakage in the Package is that sectors exposed to carbon leakage will continue to receive 100% of their allowances free of charge. In its proposal, the Commission also mentioned the possibility of establishing "an effective carbon equalisation system" with the view of putting EU installations on a comparable footing with those from third countries. 120 The system would essentially mean requiring those importing energyintensive products to the EU to purchase allowances corresponding to their greenhouse gas emissions during the manufacturing of the product. Final decision on the possible further measures to address carbon leakage was postponed pending the outcome of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen in December 2009. 121 The Directive requested the Commission to review the situation in light of the outcome of the international negotiations, prepare a report by June 2010 and make "appropriate proposals," such as "inclusion in the Community scheme of importers of products" in sectors that are exposed to a significant risk of carbon leakage. 122 This proposal has provoked criticism with concerns having been raised over its compatibility with WTO law 123 and with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC. 124
In its report in May 2010, the Commission noted that given the uncertainties surrounding international climate policy, 125 the measures already included in the Package to address carbon leakage -free allowances and access to international offsets -remain justified. 126 124 Ibid., 51, where Dhar and Das argue that in light of the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, developing countries should not be expected to carry out similar actions as are taken by developed countries like the EU. 125 On the hurdles in Copenhagen, see "Summary and Analysis" Earth Negotiations Bulletin, cited supra note 44. 126 COM(2010) 265 final, cited supra note 45. In case the EU decides to step up its efforts and implement the -30% target, the Commission identifies the maintenance of free allocation of allowances to exposed sector as "the most obvious way to provide further help.
Commission also addressed the possibility of including imports into the ETS, noting that similar proposals have been discussed in the US and that "obviously it would be desirable for such initiatives to be taken together with such partners." 127 The Commission highlights, however, concerns voiced by emerging economies over such plans and draws attention to "broader issues about the EU's trade policy and its overall interest in an open trade system." 128 The Commission also acknowledges problems concerning the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC if developed and developing countries are treated in the same way in terms of climate change mitigation. 129 The Commission stresses the need to design such measures carefully in order to ensure their compatibility with WTO law and also draws attention to potential administrative difficulties arguing that "it would seem challenging to verify the performance of individual installations in third countries without a highly sophisticated monitoring and reporting system in place at installation level." 130 As an alternative, the Commission raises the possibility of "a more targeted approach to the nature and recognition of international credits in the ETS," mentioning a possible pilot for EU/China sectoral crediting on steel and highlights technology transfer as another means of helping emerging economies to close a competitive gap. 131 The discussion on carbon leakage illustrates the prominent international dimension of the Package. The Commission is acutely aware of the close link between the carbon leakage provisions in the revised EU ETS Directive and the WTO regime, and the potential challenges that could follow from a decision to include some energy-intensive imported products under the ETS. 132 The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities under the UNFCCC also plays a role in designing the EU's legislation on carbon leakage and the Commission highlights the need to consider, in particular, the situation of Least Developed Countries. 133 From the point of view of legislative technique, it is certainly interesting -even unusual -that a close and explicit connection is made between the outcome of international negotiations and possible changes to domestic legislation. In other words, possible further action on carbon leakage is explicitly linked in the operative text of the Directive to the outcome of negotiations on the future climate regime under the UNFCCC. 134 From a broader perspective, the interplay between European law and international law concerning carbon leakage could also be seen as supporting the argument made elsewhere that climate change law is emerging as a new legal discipline blurring the distinctions between international, regional and domestic law. 135
E. Linking Emission Trading Schemes
The international dimensions of the ETS are not limited to climate finance and carbon leakage. As discussed above, the decision to adopt the ETS was linked to the EU's desire to play a global leadership role in the battle against climate change and the ETS is seen "an important building block for the development of a global network of emission trading systems." 136 In other words, the EU is hoping that the ETS will help to expand the global carbon market through interlinked emissions trading schemes, first within countries belonging to the OECD and later including other major economies. 137 Interestingly, the EU effort to support the creation of a global carbon market is also featuring more and more prominently in the EU bilateral external relations. 138 The Package introduced some reforms to facilitate the EU's ambition to expand the global carbon market.
In its original form, the ETS Directive allowed for linking the ETS with schemes in other industrialised countries having ratified the Kyoto Protocol. 139 Due to the fact that the US will not ratify the Kyoto Protocol, 140 new provisions were added to the ETS Directive, making it possible to recognise allowances from "compatible" and "mandatory" emissions trading schemes with absolute emission caps in "any other country" or "sub-federal or regional entities" 141 The language is such that it would enable linking the ETS with either a federal or regional emissions trading scheme in the US. From the US domestic perspective, both alternatives remain open. 142 From a global perspective, a link between the ETS and a federal emissions trading scheme in the US would have important implications: not only would it be "a strong political signal for the creation of a global carbon market, but would eliminate competitive concerns between these two players caused by different carbon prices." 143 The scheme would also provide "the backbone for the overall international climate regime, with subsequent enlargements to other developed and developing countries." 144 Also other OECD countries, such as Australia, New Zealand and Japan are considering or have already launched national greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes. For this reason, the new provisions in the ETS Directive concerning links with other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes highlight the international dimension and relevance of the Package. 136 Europa, "Questions and Answers on the revised EU Emissions Trading System" (Press Release) Memo/08/796 (17 Dec. 2008). 137 "EU Action Against Climate Change…", cited supra note 71. 138 For instance, according to the Joint Statement resulting from the Fifth Summit between the EU and the Republic of Korea, "EU-Republic of Korea, Joint Press Statement" (Brussels, 6 Oct. 2010), leaders noted that the EU's emissions trading scheme experience is a useful example in strengthening global carbon market mechanisms <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/116900.pdf> accessed 10 Nov. 2010. 139 Directive 2003/87/EC, cited supra note 20, Art. 25, providing that "Agreements should be concluded with third countries listed in Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol which have ratified the Protocol to provide for the mutual recognition of allowances between the Community scheme and other greenhouse gas emissions trading schemes in accordance with the rules set out in Art. 300 of the Treaty." 140 
THE EFFORT-SHARING DECISION
As mentioned above, the ETS Directive is complemented by the Effort-sharing Decision, 145 which is also significant both from an internal and external environmental integration perspective. For sectors not covered by the ETS and representing approximately 60% of the EU's greenhouse gas emissions, the Effort-Sharing Decision introduces a national emission target for each Member State during the period 2013-2020. In average, the reduction in the sectors covered by the Effort Sharing Decision will be 10% from 2005 levels by 2020 (see Figure 1 ). According to the Decision, the national target for each Member State was determined through a process seeking to reflect fairness, with targets set as a function of the per capita Gross Domestic Product (GDP): countries with high GDP per capita are required to reduce their emissions, while those with lower GDP per capita are allowed increasing them. 146 The targets adopted as a part of the Package were the same as those initially proposed by the Commission. Instead, what were modified during the political negotiations leading to the adoption of the Package were the rules applicable to meeting the targets.
The Decision applies to sectors such as transport, heating in buildings and waste. Emissions in these sectors tend to be diffuse and have important differences in mitigation potentials, which is why Member States may use their discretion as to where to concentrate their efforts. It is useful to note that emissions from land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF) are not included in the Package but the Commission was supposed to propose their inclusion once the international LULUCF rules have been agreed -alternatively, as currently looks likely, the Member States may specify their intentions regarding LULUCF if there is no international agreement by the end of 2010. 147 In practice, the LULUCF sector is important as it accounted for some 8% of the EU's total emissions in 2008. 148 In September 2010, the Commission launched public consultations on whether LULUCF should be included in the EU's 20%, or 30%, target. 149 Under the Effort-sharing Decision, each Member State must implement its binding annual target. 150 The target is subject to strict reporting and compliance checks. 151 Member States that are in non-compliance will be subject to coercive action. 152 It is also possible for Member States to transfer emission rights among themselves 153 or to implement EU-wide projects. 154 Vedder identifies two international elements in the Effort-sharing Decision: first, as in the case of the EU ETS, there is explicit provision for adjustments depending on the evolution of the international climate change legal framework; second, Member States are called upon to ensure that purchase of credits enhance the equitable geographic distribution of CDM projects and achievement of an international agreement on climate change. 155 This international dimension relates to the possibility to use carbon credits generated by the CDM for which the Effort-sharing Decision contains detailed rules. 156 This possibility also ties in with EU bilateral external efforts to support the CDM in third countries. 157 Indeed, the preamble of the Effort-Sharing Decision provides that the Member State should be able to use additional credits resulting from agreements concluded between the EU and third countries. The interplay between EU domestic law and international action, at the multilateral and bilateral level, is also visible in the CCS Directive, which is discussed next.
CARBON CAPTURE AND STORAGE
A new legal initiative included in the Package, the CCS Directive presents interesting international dimensions, particularly with reference to internal environmental integration. The latter point is clearly reflected in the purpose of the Directive, which is to establish a "legal framework for the environmentally safe geological storage of carbon dioxide to contribute to the fight against climate change" and to "eliminate as far as possible negative effects and any risk to the environment and human health." 158 The CCS Directive is the world's first example of legislation dedicated to this issue. 159 150 Ibid., Art. 3 . Essentially, the targets are a linear reduction path. The starting point is based on average emissions in 2008-2010 and the end point is in 2020. According to Art. 3.3, banking is possible and a Member State may carry forward from the following year a quantity of up to 5 % of its annual emission allocation. 151 Ibid., Art. 6 and 7. 152 Ibid., Art. 7. . 153 Ibid., Art. 3.4, according to which a Member State may also transfer up to 5 % of its annual emission allocation to other Member States. 154 Ibid., Art. 5.7, according to which Member States may use credits from Community-level projects issued pursuant to Art. 24a of Directive 2003/87/EC towards their emission reduction commitments, without any quantitative limit. 155 Vedder, see note 8 supra, at 6, referring respectively to Art. 5(1), 8 and 9 of the Effort-sharing Decision, cited supra note 21. In this regard, the Effort Sharing Decision limits the annual use of credits to 3% of the Member State's greenhouse gas emissions in 2005, plus a possible additional share of its 3% annual quantity transferred by another Member State. See Art. 5.4 and 5.6 of the Effort-Sharing Decision, cited supra note 21. Article 5.5 contains rather complex criteria according to which certain Member States may use additional credits amounting to 1% of their 2005 emissions. 156 Ibid., Art. 5. 157 Certain bilateral Association or Partnership and Cooperation Agreements between the EU and third countries contain explicit reference to cooperation related to the CDM (see, for instance, Political Dialogue and Cooperation Agreement with Central America, Art. 25 < http://www.eeas.europa.eu/ca/pol/pdca_12_03_en.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010). 158 Art. 1 of Directive 2009/31/EC, cited supra note 22. 159 Kelly, Oberthür and Pallemaerts, see note 32 supra, p. 19. There, is however, proposed CCS legislation in the US Senate: S:\WPSHR\LEGCNSL\XYWRITE\SCI10\CCS1.X9, see "Rockefeller, Voinovich introduce carbon According to the IPCC, carbon dioxide capture and storage is "a process consisting of the separation of CO2 from industrial and energy-related sources, transport to a storage location and long-term isolation from the atmosphere." 160 Many argue that CCS holds great promise in the fight against climate change: if successful, CCS would decouple CO 2 emissions from the use of fossil fuels, effectively decarbonising the energy sector. CCS, however, is a nondemonstrated technology with several question marks surrounding it. As the Directive acknowledges:
Each of the different components of CCS, namely capture, transport and storage of CO2, has been the object of pilot projects on a smaller scale than that required for their industrial application. These components still need to be integrated into a complete CCS process, technological costs need to be reduced and more and better scientific knowledge has to be gathered. It is therefore important that Community efforts on CCS demonstration within an integrated policy framework start as soon as possible." 161
The rationale for the EU legislative initiative on CCS therefore lies both in the recognition that global greenhouse gas emissions could not be reduced by 50% by 2050 in a cost-efficient manner without CCS, and concerns related to the environmental sustainability of the technology. 162 The Commission in fact identified in its impact assessment the risk that carbon dioxide captures and stored does not remain isolated from the atmosphere and biosphere, concluding that land take associated with CCS deployment would be relatively small, and that major impacts on biodiversity would result from land fragmentation. 163 Nonetheless, CCS technology is associated with safety and environmental risks, including leakage, transport and sudden release of CO2, which in large quantities could be lethal. Like other large industrial installations, there are issues with storage sites, licensing, and public acceptance. 164 In addition, permanence is an important concern related to CCS, in other words, whether it will be possible ensure that the CO2 stored does not find its way back to the atmosphere. Because CO2 is stored for the longer-range future, it also has long-term implications, including those of inter-generational equity. 165 Others stem from legal and emissions liabilities in case of carbon release. 166 For these reasons, Member States have discretion in determining whether to make available sites for storage and to identify such sites, as well as to determine the conditions for site use. 167 Besides creating an enabling legal framework, the Package also seeks to provide economic incentives and encourage the setting up of network of demonstration plants not only across Europe but also in key third countries, 168 thus also embodying a bilateral external dimension. Of particular relevance is a provision of the ETS Directive for setting aside up to 300 million EUAs supporting up to 12 CCS demonstration projects. 169 At current EUA prices in the ! 15 range, 170 this is a EU "subsidy" of about !4500 million, or ! 375 million per demonstration project. In addition, the new guidelines on State Aid for environmental protection, 171 combined with the existence of the CCS Directive, facilitate Member State support for the demonstration projects. In particular, the guidelines state that "the means to support [CCS] (…) could constitute state aid (…) but it is too early to lay down guidelines relating to the authorisation of any such aid. (…) the Commission will have a generally positive attitude towards State aid for such projects." 172 In addition to being very costly, CCS demonstration projects face many hurdles, including technical, legal, safety and environmental considerations. Proponents of CCS have attempted for several years to have the technology, or at least pilot projects, included under the CDM, 173 in order to secure the necessary financial political support to carry out those projects. Those attempts have not been successful so far 174 and, at most, the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol have recognized that CCS is a 'possible mitigation technology' that raises concerns related to outstanding issues related to, inter alia, non-permanence and environmental impacts. 175 . 176 Some of the criticism to inclusion of CCS under the CDM has also been based on moral grounds, namely that developing countries should not be used as testing grounds for unproven technology. Pressure on the EU to legislate on CCS thus originated from various sources: part the lack of progress under the UNFCCC; in part the need to show global leadership and address moral concerns; but also industry lobby to allow the first demonstration projects and facilitate the long-term commercialization of this technology.
A. Environmental Integration Dimensions
The Directive focuses on the regulation of CO2 geological storage, 177 providing for the removal of unintended barriers in existing legislation (notably, on waste and water). 178 It further explains its linkages with existing EU environmental law, clarifying that the Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control (IPPC) Directive 179 applies to capture 180 -given that it presents similar risks than chemical and power generation sectors 181 -and the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Directive 182 applies to capture and transport, as well as to storage sites 183given that it presents the similar risks to transport of natural gas. 184 It is worth recalling that EIA outcomes will not necessarily result in specific permit conditions, as the obligation is to take them into account 185 leaving broad discretion to relevant authorities. 186 Furthermore, liability for local environmental damage caused by CCS is regulated by the Environmental Liability Directive, 187 and complemented by the inclusion of storage sites under ETS Directive. 188 In terms of internal environmental integration, the regulatory system for CCS is premised on a selection of storage sites aiming to ensure the absence of significant risk of leakage and significant environmental or health risk. 189 The selection is preceded by an assessment taking into account proximity of the proposed project site to valuable natural resources, such as protected areas included in the Natura 2000 network, potable groundwater and hydrocarbons. 190 It also includes a risk assessment composed of exposure assessment 191 and effects assessment, 192 as well as other factors that could pose a hazard to human health or the environment. 193 The central regulatory tool is the storage permit, which is subject to review by the Commission leading to a non-binding opinion 194 to enhance public confidence. 195 The application to obtain the permit needs to include a description of measures to prevent 'significant irregularities.' 196 (defined as any irregularity in the injection or storage operation which implies a risk to the environment or human health 197 ). Permit conditions include observance of other relevant EU legislation. 198 Environmental safety is further guaranteed by the requirement to ensure that no waste or other matter may be added to the CO2 stream, and that concentrations of incidental and added substances do not pose a significant risk to the environment or breach requirements of other applicable Union law. 199 Monitoring to be carried out by the operator includes the surrounding environment for the purpose of, inter alia, detecting significant adverse effects, in particular to drinking water, human populations and users of surrounding biosphere. 200 Member States' competent authorities also check compliance with such monitoring obligations.
It should be also noted that provisions on public participation can serve to ensure internal environmental integration: in the case of the CCS Directive, a succinct provision on access to information 201 may facilitate the role of the public as watchdogs for the overall environmental sustainability of CCS activities. The requirement for Member States to make publicly available environmental information related to the geological storage of CO2 202 is coupled with public participation requirements under the EIA and IPPC Directives. It is, however, doubtful whether sufficient stakeholder involvement is provided for, given that under the EIA Directive there is no provision for consultation before environmental information is provided by the developer, so that there is no opportunity for public input when the necessity and scope of an environmental impact assessment is determined. 203 When compared with the minimum guarantees called for by civil society, 204 the EU seems to have taken on board concerns related to CCS as add-on to energy efficiency, renewables and sustainable land use; safe and permanent storage in locations that do not allow leakage or gassing out assessed and confirmed through independent scientific review; and avoidance of open oceans and sea floor. It remains unclear, however, whether the provisions put in place at EU level will also preclude interference or negative direct or indirect impacts on biodiversity, given that the EIA Directive is not considered well-equipped to fully take into account biodiversity concerns. 205 Finally, civil society called for ruling out open aquifers and lakes, 206 which is not reflected in the EU Directive.
B. International dimensions
There are key international dimensions linked to the legislative effort by the EU to ensure internal environmental integration with respect to CCS. CCS is discussed at the international level in several fora. 207 In addition to the ongoing discussions under the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol, the 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter, 1972, has been amended to allow CCS in subseabed geological formations. 208 The latter development has been explicitly quoted in the preamble of the CCS Directive. 209 In addition, the EU prohibits storage in the water column and beyond the areas under the jurisdiction of its Member States, 210 taking on board the concerns raised within the Convention on Biological Diversity 211 and by the decision of the Parties to the OSPAR Convention to prohibit placement of CO2 in the water column and on the seabed. 212 Furthermore, one of the main purposes of the Directive is to bring a 'pioneering" example of domestic legislation inspired by internal environmental integration to the multilateral negotiations table as a source of inspiration for the development of international law and of national law. 213 Indeed, the recent EU 214 submission to the UNFCCC Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice stresses that industrialized countries can 'take the lead' in developing and deploying CCS, mentioning the CCS Directive as "a useful example for enabling CCS in other jurisdictions, respecting legal, cultural, social and administrative differences." 215 There the EU outlines various suggestions for the inclusion of CCS in the CDM, based on its own legal tools for site-selection, monitoring, allocation of responsibility to one entity only, EIA (including social aspectsalthough these are not covered by the EU EIA Directive), risk assessment, requirements for the composition of CO2 streams, and liability. 216 To support its position before the other Parties to the Kyoto Protocol, the EU also explicitly links its available support to developing countries in terms of bilateral external action, mentioning its readiness to provide capacitybuilding and engage in collaborative research and development, exchange of views on policy issues including legal frameworks, as well as opportunities for scientific collaboration between EU and non-EU researchers on CCS. 217 This reflects the more generic reference to technology cooperation with key countries that was made in the CCS Directive preamble. 218 6. RENEWABLE ENERGY In addition to the CCS Directive, provisions emphasising internal environmental integration can be found in the Renewables Directive, which has three objectives: environmental sustainability, energy security and technology innovation. 219 In the context of the Package, it seeks to implement the EU's target of increasing the share of renewable energy to 20% of primary energy consumption and 10% of the energy used in the transport sector by 2020. This section will first introduce the overall legal scheme to support the achievement of the 2020 renewables targets, and then discuss more in detail the sustainability criteria for biofuels as a salient feature of the Package both in terms of internal environmental integration, as well as for their complex international dimensions.
The energy sector is engrained in the fabric of the European Union, dating as far back as the European Coal and Steel Community in the 1950s. EU legislation on renewable energy emerged in the late 1970s as a response to the oil shocks, and was initially conceived as distinct from climate change. 220 First environmental integration efforts in the EU energy policy were made in the context of the fuel quality standards and implicitly in the context of energy efficiency standards and research and development programmes. In the 1990s, electricity from renewable energy sources was considered in the context of electricity liberalization. The 1995 White Paper on an Energy Policy for the European Union 221 made clear that promotion of energy efficient technologies and energy conservation efforts were regarded as action designed to achieve both security of energy supply and environmental goals, and the objective of energy security was considered largely compatible with environmental integration. On the other hand, the push towards a common energy market was less compatible with environmental objectives. 222 In the early 2000s, EU legislation was adopted on renewable electricity 223 , fuels 224 and heat. 225 The EU approach to renewables, though, was fragmented, with each sector having its own separate legislation.
Against this background, the Package signalled a shift in approach based on the integrated nature and inter-relationships between energy policy (comprising efficiency, security and renewables) and climate policy, 226 and within renewables, including all sectors under a single directive. This shift is also reflected in the new legal basis for the EU policy on energy inserted in the TFEU by the Treaty of Lisbon, where "regard for the need to preserve and improve the environment" is called for in all aspects of energy policy, namely: ensuring the functioning of the energy market; ensuring security of energy supply in the Union; promoting energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and promoting the interconnection of energy networks. 227 It should be noted that the TFEU has not changed the unanimity rule required for adopting measures that affect Member States' sources and structure of energy supply. 228 The overall legal framework supporting achievement of the 2020 target for renewable energy comprises five elements: obligatory national targets for 2020; national renewable energy action plans; flexible mechanisms allowing for cross-financing between Member States for the achievement of the EU target; 229 administrative and regulatory reforms; as well as biofuels sustainability criteria. 230 For the first time, Member States are to coordinate their approaches to a range of planning, certification and educational issues associated with the renewable energy sector (on the basis of both obligatory provisions and recommendations), against a new single target. 231 The targets must be consistent with a target of at least 20% share of energy from renewable sources in the EU's gross final energy consumption in 2020, which should be achieved also through energy efficiency and energy saving. 232 The legally binding and differentiated national targets for each Member States (see Table 1 ) represent a notch up in ambition from previously "indicative" targets, for example in Directive 2001/77/EC. 233 The national action plans are to determine sectoral targets for the share of energy from renewables consumed in transport, electricity, heating and cooling in 2020 and the measures to be taken to achieve national overall targets. 234 .It seems all Member States are on track to achieve them. The targets are coupled with the obligation for each Member State to achieve at least 10% of renewable energy consumption in the transport sector. 235 As mentioned above, the Renewables Directive introduced flexible mechanisms aimed at facilitating the achievement of the 20% target. While most of the mechanisms focus on cooperation between the Member States, they also make it possible to count electricity purchased from third countries against the national target of a Member States. Article 6 enables statistical transfers between Member States. This mechanism can be compared to international emissions trading under Article 17 of the Kyoto Protocol whereby one country transfers part of its emissions quota to another country. Under Article 7, two or more Member States can also implement joint projects, which may involve private parties, that relate to the production of energy from renewable electricity, heating or cooling. 236 This mechanism is similar to Joint Implementation under Article 6 of the Kyoto Protocol, which enables two countries with emission reduction targets to implement climate-friendly projects and agree on the transfer of the ensuing emission reductions. Article 11 of the Renewables Directive also makes it possible to create joint support schemes, whereby two or more Member States may decide to join or partly coordinate their national support schemes, and a certain amount of renewable energy produced in the territory of one participating Member State may count towards the national target of another Member State. 237 An international dimension to the Renewables Directive emerges from the third mechanism under Article 9, which focuses on joint projects between EU Member States and third countries. 238 While this provision will be of limited practical relevance to meet the 2020 targets, it establishes a framework for third-country projects which may be important to meet targets beyond 2020, and represents a lifeline to projects such as DESERTEC, 239 which is trying to deploy renewable electricity capacity in North Africa for European consumption. This mechanism has elements resembling the CDM established under the Kyoto Protocol, which allows developed countries to benefit from carbon credits generated in developing countries. It reinforces the international dimension of the Package and allows third countries to access finance for renewables infrastructure. 240 However, according to recent estimates by the Commission, the flexibility mechanisms will not play a major role in meeting the renewable energy target: only five Member States are not expected to meet their targets exclusively with domestic sources and only 1% of energy is expected to be traded between Member States or third countries. 241 It should further be noted that a standard clause in most Association and Partnership/Cooperation Agreements between the EU and third countries or regions systematically call for cooperation in renewables. 242 Thus, the EU has an additional legal basis, enshrined in an international bilateral treaty, for specifically supporting renewables in third countries: this type of clause may allow the EU to support the implementation of key provisions of the Renewables Directive beyond its borders, with the consent of the third country/region involved. The international dimension of the Renewables Directive becomes even more evident when focusing attention on its unprecedented sustainability criteria for the production of biofuels, discussed next.
Biofuels sustainability criteria
Biofuels have been in the international spotlight for several reasons, including concerns regarding food security, adverse environmental impacts and deforestation, additional pressure on dwindling land and water resources, potential negative effects on indigenous and local communities and small-holder farmers, as well as introduction and spread of genetically modified organisms or of invasive alien species. 243 In addition, the debate still continues on whether the use of biofuels reduces greenhouse gases and to what extent if the whole lifecycle analysis is considered.
To address those concerns, and to ensure that biofuels promoted by the Package avoided negative environmental impacts, particularly deforestation and loss of biodiversity, the EU introduced sustainability criteria -one of the most innovative features of the package. 244 These criteria are also reflected in the Fuel Specification Directive, which includes, verbatim, all language from the Renewables Directive applicable to biofuels. 245 The decision of the EU to adopt pioneering legislation containing sustainability criteria for biofuels should be placed in the broader context of ongoing negotiations in various multilateral fora on possible international standards in this respect. 246 In the context of the CBD, specifically, entrenched positions have been presented as to whether international standards should be developed to ensure maximizing the positive and minimizing the negative impacts of biofuels on the environment, biodiversity and local and indigenous communities. 247 In 2008, Parties to the CBD agreed that biofuel production and use should be sustainable in relation to biological diversity through the development and application of sound policy frameworks, research and monitoring of the positive and negative impacts of the production and use of biofuels on biodiversity and related socio-economic aspects, including those related to indigenous and local communities; strengthened development cooperation with a view to promote the sustainable production and use of biofuels; and encouraging the private sector to improve social and environmental performance of the production of biofuels. 248 The EU continues to support the development of international standards at the CBD, 249 mentioning its own sustainability criteria as a relevant example in that respect. This subsection will in turn look into the environmental integration aspects of the criteria, as well as their international dimension both in terms of WTO law compatibility and of inclusion in the EU bilateral external action.
a) Environmental integration
Similarly to the CCS Directive, the EU seems to have adopted legislation on biofuels with a view to showing leadership on a controversial issue. The EU domestic provisions represent an attempt to ensure internal environmental integration with a view to providing a goodpractice example to other countries for action at the national level or to influence international negotiations.
The selection of criteria is purposely based on explicit references to MEAs and related international processes. Specifically, the criteria are land-related (concerning land with high biodiversity value and land with high carbon stock), which fulfill the internal dimension of the environmental integration principle, and on greenhouse gas emission savings (of at least 245 Art. 17 of the Renewables Directive, cited supra note 23, and Art. 7b of the new Fuel Specification Directive, cited supra note 59, read verbatim in all provisions regarding biofuels. The Renewables Directive contains additional text for bioliquids. 246 EurActiv, "NGOs slam draft version of EU biofuel law" (11 Jan. 2008) <http://www.euractiv.com/en/transport/ngos-slam-draft-version-eu-biofuel-law/article-169470> accessed 9 Nov. 2010. 247 Summary of the Fourteenth Meeting of the Subsidiary Body on Scientific, Technical and Technological Advice to the CBD: 10-21 May 2010, Nairobi, Kenya, ENB vol. 9, n. 514, 24 May 2010, at 12-14; Subsidiary body on scientific, technical and technological advice (SBSTTA) to the CBD, "Biofuels and biodiversity: Consideration of ways and means to promote the positive and minimize the negative impacts of the production and use of biofuels on biodiversity" (Recommendations, Nairobi, 10 -22 May 2010) <http://www.cbd.int/doc/meetings/sbstta/sbstta-14/in-session/sbstta-14-recommendations-en.pdf> accessed 11 Nov. 2010. 35% 250 ), which contribute towards environmental integrity. While these two sets of criteria apply both to imported biofuels and to those produced within the EU, an additional criteria of cross-compliance applies only to the latter. Thus, for biofules produced within the EU, the Directive requires compliance with existing requirements under EU environmental law for agriculture, including protection of groundwater and surface water quality and social requirements. 251 With regards to biodiversity concerns, the Directive requires that biofuels and bioliquids must not be made from raw material obtained from land with high biodiversity value, namely: land that in or after January 2008 has the status of primary forest (according to the definition used by the FAO in its Global Forest Resource Assessment; and 252 ) protected areas, unless evidence is provided that the production of that raw material did not interfere with those nature protection purposes, or highly biodiverse grassland. 253 With regards to non-natural highly biodiverse grasslands, an exception is possible if harvesting of raw material was necessary to preserve the area's grassland status. 254 In addition, the Directive's preamble points to the possibility for the Commission to take due account of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 255 -the first scientific assessment of the consequences of ecosystem change on human well-being undertaken in 2005 -which contains useful data for the conservation of at least those areas that provide basic ecosystem services in critical situations such as watershed protection and erosion control. 256 For other biodiversity dimensions that are not explicitly covered by the sustainability criteria, the Directive provides complementary monitoring requirements: Member States are to report on estimated impacts of biofuels production on biodiversity, water resources, water quality and soil quality within their territories, 257 while the Commission is expected to report on possible broader impacts in Member States and third countries that are a significant source of raw material for biofuels consumed within the Union as to their ratification and implementation of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the Convention on the International Trade in Endangered Species. 258 Another relevant criteria at the intersection of biodiversity and climate change concerns is the prohibition to derive biofuels from raw material obtained from land with high carbon stock, namely land that had in January 2008 and no longer has that status of wetlands (as defined in the Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 259 ), or continuously forested areas or areas with 10-30% canopy cover. 260 Using such land for biofuels production would result in a negative net greenhouse gas emission reduction impact given that CO2 is released into the atmosphere as a result of land conversion 261 The Commission has indicated that monitoring compliance with land-related criteria can take the form of aerial photographs, satellite images, maps, land register entries and site surveys. 262 While noting the importance of broader land use issues, 263 the final compromise did not provide for the inclusion of other environmental or social concerns in the sustainability criteria, but rather to task the Commission with biannual reports on the impact on social sustainability in the EU and in third countries of increased demand for biofuel, on the impact of the EU' biofuel policy on the availability of foodstuffs at affordable prices, in particular for people living in developing countries, and wider development issues, including the respect of land-use rights and implementation of listed human rights and labour conventions. 264 Thus, the matter is kept under review for the time being, with the possibility in the short-term (2012) for the Commission to propose 'corrective action, in particular if evidence shows that biofuels production has a significant impact on food prices.' 265 Similarly, the Commission is to report in 2012 and propose corrective action as to whether it would be 'feasible and appropriate to introduce mandatory requirements in relation to air, soil and water protection, taking into account the latest scientific evidence and the EU international obligations.' 266 This more cautious approach certainly reflects current impasses in multilateral negotiations, where discussions of social issues related to biofules, such as land tenure and food prices, as well as impacts on indigenous and local communities, remain very controversial. 267 Provisions on public participation may also be instrumental in ensuring internal environmental integration. The Renewables Directive requires that the Member States ensure public information on the availability and environmental benefits of all different renewable sources of energy for transport. When the percentages of biofuels, blended in mineral oil derivatives, exceed 10% by volume, Member States shall require this to be indicated at the sales points. 268 In addition, the Commission is to create an online public transparency platform to facilitate and promote cooperation between Member States and make public relevant information that the Commission or a Member State deems to be of key importance to the Directive and to the achievement of its objectives, 269 but no specific mention of the support; 279 meeting the Fuel Quality Directive GHG emissions reductions targets; 280 investment and/or operating aid in accordance with the Guidelines on state aid for environmental protection; 281 and the provisions for alternative-fuel vehicles. 282 It should be noted that in February 2010 the Commission indicated that it did not intend to recommend binding sustainability criteria for solid biomass and biogas used in electricity, heating and cooling, but suggest voluntary criteria for Member States to include on national schemes, with the possibility to review this decision in 2011 283 given that the relevant impact assessment indicated that 'no policy tool can give certainty that forests will be regenerated after biomass is harvested.' 284 Member States are expected to check operators' compliance 285 with the sustainability criteria via three methods: a national system -i.e. requesting operators to provide national authorities with data on compliance 286 subject to independent auditing of the information submitted; 287 a voluntary scheme recognized by the Commission for that purpose; 288 or a bilateral or multilateral agreement concluded by the EU, recognized by the Commission for this purpose. 289 While national systems will be based on the default values set by the Renewables Directive to show compliance with the GHG emission savings, the other two systems may also cover other sustainability issues that are not covered by the Directive. 290
c) Bilateral external dimension
Not only are the sustainability criteria systematically invoked by the EU in multilateral negotiations on biofuels, 291 but they also have a bilateral international dimension. Motivated by the concern that biofuels production in third countries might not respect minimum environmental or social requirements and the aim to promote the production of biofuels and bioliquids worldwide in a sustainable manner, 292 the Directive indicates that the EU will endeavour to conclude bilateral or multilateral agreements with third countries containing provisions on the sustainability criteria. 293 This could also be seen in the context of WTO law: in the Shrimp-Turtle case it was found that the US (unsuccessful) bilateral negotiations with countries targeted by its environmental trade restrictions were relevant for determining WTO law compatibility of the measure. 294 To this end, the Directive specifically requires due consideration for measures taken for the conservation of areas that provide in critical situations basic ecosystem services and states that the Commission may also recognize areas for the protection of ecosystems or species protected by international agreements for the purposes of taking into account land, labour and additional environmental concerns not covered by the sustainability criteria, or included in lists drawn up by intergovernmental organizations or The International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) for the purposes of fulfilling the high biodiversity value land criteria. 295 In addition, the Directive calls upon the Commission to maintain a dialogue and exchange information with third countries and biofuels producers, consumer organizations and civil society concerning the general implementation of the Directive, and in particular the impact of biofuels production on food prices. 296 Finally, the Commission is required to monitor the origin of biofuels and the impacts of their production on land use in third countries of supply with a view to analyzing the impact of increased demand for biofuels on sustainability in these countries, considering economic and environmental impacts, including on biodiversity This is reflected in the external action instruments used by the EU in its relations with third countries.. 297 While specific cooperation on biofuels is not mentioned in the Association and Partnership/Cooperation Agreement between the EU and third countries (beyond what can be implied by more generic obligations on cooperation on renewables mentioned above), the Sustainability Impact Assessments that assess the trade component of the Union agreements with third countries to address trade-offs between economic growth and its environment and social impacts, have in some instances, included certification for biofuels among policy recommendation to ensure sustainability 298 or even more specifically made reference to the Renewables Directive and its criteria as guidance for third countries. 299 Overall, the sustainability criteria for biofuels clearly take into account a great variety of environmental concerns in an attempt to satisfy internal environmental integration. They do so, however, in a phased approach, that has prioritized certain biodiversity concerns and allows for early review to reflect progress in multilateral negotiations. This is tightly linked to the international dimensions of the Package, as the EU actively promotes such a holistic approach to biofuels showcasing its sustainability criteria not only through its interventions in relevant multilateral fora, but also through its bilateral relations. It remains to be seen how effective the criteria will be in third countries, given the reliance on economic operators and independent auditors for its enforcement, and the oversight role left for the Commission considering its limited resources for fulfilling its monitoring obligations. 300 It has also been noted that corrective measures envisaged by the Directive in case of negative reports on sustainability in third countries will most likely entail a policy declaration, to avoid any WTO law incompatibility issues. 301 8. CONCLUSIONS This analysis shows that the contribution of the EU's Climate and Energy Package to the goal of environmental integration is, at least on paper, significant. The EU has attempted to mainstream climate change considerations into a range of sectors (external environmental integration), which is necessary given the multitude of activities and actors that must be engaged to effectively mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. The EU ETS plays an important role in this regard as setting a price for greenhouse gas emissions is commonly viewed as one of the most important mitigation tools. 302 The Package has contributed to this objective, first, by affirming that emissions trading will continue in the EU regardless of international climate policy developments and possible second commitment period under the Kyoto Protocol. The Package has also extended the carbon price signal by broadening the scope of the ETS both in terms of activities and greenhouse gases covered. Finally, the Package has also provided more certainty concerning the scale of emission reductions required in the ETS sector by including in the Directive provisions on a linearly declining, EU-wide emissions cap. As discussed above, however, setting the price signal and emissions cap at the right level has proven difficult -without new measures for the third trading period, the effectiveness of the ETS in promoting low-emissions investment is questionable. Binding emission reduction targets for Member States in sectors not covered by the ETS, through the Effort-sharing Decision, also contribute to external environmental integration, as do measures to implement the 20% energy efficiency target. For example, car manufacturers have been subjected to a binding obligation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from their average fleet. In addition, the tighter links between the EU climate policy and energy policy certainly contribute to climate change mainstreaming in several sectors.
Through the Package, the EU has also attempted to "increase positive and reduce negative impacts of climate change mitigation and adaptation measures on biodiversity", 303 consistent with the internal dimension of environmental integration. The most obvious examples of internal integration in the Package are the legal tools chosen to ensure the environmental sustainability of CCS projects and the sustainability criteria for biofuels. The CCS Directive is remarkable in that it is the first piece of legislation in the world aiming to create a legal framework for environmentally safe CCS projects. The Directive promotes internal integration, inter alia, through links to other EU environmental legislation, such as the IPPC and EIA Directives, to ensure that broader environmental considerations are taken into account when using CCS to mitigate climate change. As to biofules, the 10% renewable energy target in the transport sector was perhaps the most controversial element of the Package with strong concerns voiced concerning its environmental and social implications. This led to the inclusion in the Package of detailed sustainability criteria for both EU produced and imported biofuels. The sustainability criteria provide a clear example of internal integration as they attempt to ensure that the production of biofules in the EU or in foreign countries does not lead to biodiversity loss 304 while also achieving a minimum level of greenhouse gas emission savings 305 The analysis of the Package through the lens of the environmental integration principle has thus helped to explain the EU's efforts to play a global leadership role in the fight against climate change through its attempts to use the Package to influence multilateral negotiations, such as under the CBD and Kyoto Protocol, to ensure that also other relevant international regimes reflect environmental integration. In addition, the EU clearly expects the Package to act as models for other countries on an individual basis.
Against this background, the Package clearly reflects the EU's desire to pioneer innovative and sustainable responses to climate change. Under the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU has frequently highlighted elements of the Package and encouraged other Parties to adopt similar measures. The interdependence of the international and European dimensions is also reflected in the way EU legislation is drafted with direct references to international instruments and notable review clauses in the Package linked to developments in ongoing international negotiations. 306 However, the internationalizing approach to European law-making has also surfaced questions concerning the compatibility of parts of the Package with WTO law. This concerns especially provisions related to carbon leakage and the possible carbon equalizer system in the context of the EU ETS and the biofuels sustainability criteria in the Renewables Directive. The idea of requiring developing country importers to purchase credits under the ETS has also surfaced concerns over its compatibility with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities under the UNFCCC. Both have also been recognised by the Commission. It has been argued that EU's efforts to influence global developments through its internal environmental legislation can be seen as a strategy to shield EU law from WTO challenges by putting pressure on other jurisdictions to adopt similar environmental legislation and/or adopt corresponding international standards, thus protecting the competitive interests of European companies that have to comply with high-standard environmental regulation. 307 However, another explanation is that for the EU to fulfil its environmental integration principle and its objective of pursuing global solutions to climate change, the main driver of the globalization of EU law is that of promoting holistic environmental multilateralism with the secondary effect of 'running the risk" of WTO law incompatibility. The present analysis of the key elements of the Package (particularly concerning carbon leakage and sustainability criteria for biofuels) reveals how the EU carefully calculates such risk and attempts to avoid solutions that would be clearly incompatible with the WTO Agreements.
This article has also highlighted some of the complex and increasingly more explicit interactions between both the EU's position under multilateral fora and its domestic legislation with the EU's bilateral external relations. Bilateral relations are used by the EU to support the implementation of multilateral environmental obligations in third countries (particularly developing ones), as well as to create or strengthen alliances with third countries 304 However, the outcome concerning indirect land-use change has been considered as weak. Phillips, "European Parliament capitulates on biofuels deal" EuObserver (5 Dec. 2008) <http://euobserver.com/9/27236> accessed 10 Nov. 2010. 305 For criticism of this approach, see conclusions by Vedder, cited supra note 8. 306 See, for example, Arts. 10b and 11a.of the EU ETS Directive, cited supra note 20, and Arts. 5.2, 5.3, 8 and 9 of the Effort-Sharing Decision, cited supra note 21. 307 Kelemen, cited supra 6. with a view to influencing ongoing multilateral negotiations. 308 This usually builds on the environmental cooperation clauses that can be found in the various Association, Cooperation and Partnerships Agreements concluded by the EU with third countries, 309 which are usually coupled with significant development cooperation and policy dialogue. 310 They can be seen as a necessary complement to EU ambitious domestic action on climate change, with a view to fulfilling the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities. While it is difficult at this stage to assess the extent to which EU bilateral relations are effectively contributing to mainstreaming climate change in other policy areas and supporting holistic and environmentally sustainable responses to climate change in third countries, it can be stated that these interactions are likely to increase in the near future: 311 in the wake of the UN Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling for mainstreaming climate change in bilateral external relations; 312 and, in the second revision of the Cotonou Agreement -the world's largest economic and political framework for North-South cooperation, involving seventy-nine African, Caribbean and Pacific countries -the EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries recognize for the first time the global challenge of climate change as a major subject for their partnership, committing to raise the profile of climate change in their development cooperation, and to support ACP countries' mitigation and adaptation efforts. 313 As pointed out in the previous sections, this bilateral external dimension is increasingly reflected in the way EU 'domestic' law is framed and implemented, as demonstrated by references to bilateral agreements and initiatives with third countries in the Package, such as those related to climate funding and the expansion of the global carbon market under the EU ETS Directive, capacity building and collaborative research under the CCS Directive, joint projects under the Renewables Directive and cooperation on the biofuels sustainability criteria.
The overall conclusion is that the Package represents an innovative and comprehensive approach, aiming to integrate climate change considerations into various economic sectors and activities within the EU, while at the same time ensuring that climate change mitigation is compatible with other environmental objectives. Such an integrative approach is important given the scale of the economic and social transformation needed in the coming decades to avoid dangerous anthropogenic climate change. At the same time, it is clear that the targets underlying the Package are not ambitious enough to effectively combat climate change, to secure the environmental sustainability of climate change measures, or to achieve a radical transformation of the EU's economy. As explained above, this is well-known to the Commission and the Member States, and the possibility of the EU increasing its emission reduction target from 20% to 30% from 1990 levels by 2020 is currently being debated. 314 Under the UNFCCC negotiations, the EU has certainly come under pressure from developing countries and environmental NGOs to implement the 30% target, which is more in line with the requirements of climate science than the current 20% target, and would also convey a stronger message of the EU's global leadership in the fight against climate change. From the point of view EU domestic law, a decision to implement the 30% target would require further policies and measures, as the Package in its present form is only designed to achieve the EU's unilateral 20% target. In any case, it is clear that far more ambitious emission cuts and measures will be needed between now and 2050 for the EU to achieve its objective of cutting greenhouse gas emissions by 85% or more by 2050. Equally, the legal tools deployed by the EU to prevent or minimize possible negative environmental impacts of climate change mitigation measures, such as the phased approach to the sustainability criteria for biofuels production, represent an initial step, that may well anticipate action by other countries, but that nonetheless remain limited. To this effect, the Package constitutes a good starting point but deeper integration of climate change considerations into various economic sectors, coupled with stronger guarantees for the environmental sustainability of climate change measures, will be required. 
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